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TWO CHEERS, NOT THREE, FOR SIXTH AMENDMENT 
0RIGINALISM 
STEPHANOS BTBAS. 
This Essay makes three basic points.1 First, originalism is a 
good approach where the soil supports it, but many criminal 
procedure cases, particularly recent cases before the Supreme 
Court, lack solid historical foundations.2 The Court is trying to 
build too much of an edifice on quicksand. It is going to sink. 
Second, defense lawyers should be careful what they wish 
for. Though many defense lawyers cheer certain originalist de-
cisions, they would not like the whole package that would re-
sult from applying a consistent originalist philosophy. Justice 
Thomas might be willing to give us such a package? but it does 
not appear, on balance, more favorable to defendants than our 
current system. 
Third, although Professor Jeffrey Fisher rightly touches on 
the idea of bright-line rules,4 there are a number of areas where 
originalism leads away from bright-line rules. Justice Scalia 
likes originalism; he also likes formalism.5 In some cases, how-
*Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Pro-
fessor Jeff Fisher for a lively and illuminating debate and for his comments. 
l. This Symposium Essay expands upon and extends themes that I originally ex-
plored in Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Tri-
umph of justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 
(2005). 
2. Apprendi v. New }erset;, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), is one example. For my earlier cri-
tique of its historical moorings see Stephanos Bibas, judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence 
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1123-32 (2001). Professor 
Jeffrey Fisher, overconfident about Apprendi's originalist footing, disagrees. See 
Jeffery L. Fisher, Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34 HARV. ).L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 53, 56-57 (2010). 
3. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499-523 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
4. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 56-58. 
5. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Symposium Essays on Originalism-Foreword, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 871, 873 (2008) (discussing the future success of originalism and 
expressing hope that "the truth wiU prevail"); Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
46 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 34 
ever, a judge must choose between the two. Sometimes 
originalism contradicts doctrines such as the exclusionary rule6 
even though, intuitively, modern formalists should embrace 
the exclusionary rule because it is clear, simple, and instructs 
police exactly what not to do.7 
1. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND }URY CONTROL OF SENTENCING 
First, let us focus on the jury trial and sentencing cases. The 
ground here is soft enough to be a quagmire. The text of the 
Sixth Amendment does not define a trial or a criminal proseett-
tion.8 Does it therefore include sentencing? 
Eighteenth-century trials contained no sentencing phase.9 There 
is some evidence that juries knew of the punishments for 
crimes-more so in England than America-but there was noth-
ing like modern sentencing proceedings.10 Professor Fisher con-
cedes that many of the contentious issues in criminal litigation 
today, such as sentencing guidelines, lack solid historical founda-
tions for originalist anal ysis.11 
To return to trials as conducted in the colonial era, we would 
have to give juries the power to sentence openly. We would give 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CI-U. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (arguing that bright-line mles are 
preferable to discretionary standards). 
6. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
786 (1994) ("Supporters of the exclusionary mle cannot point to a single major state-
ment from the Founding ... supporting Fourth Amendment exclusion of evidence 
in a criminal trial. ... [E]xclusion was so implausible that .... in the rare case in 
which the argument ... was made, it received the back of the judicial hand."); Pat-
rick Tinsley et al., In Defense of Evidence m1d Against the Exclusionary Rule: A Libertar-
ian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2004) ("[F}or one hundred years after the passage 
of the Fourth Amendment, evidence of a defendant's guilt was never excluded just 
because it was obtained illegally."). 
7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary 
mle-which prevents the prosecution from admitting evidence at trial which was 
unconstitutionally acquired-applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... "). 
9. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-81 (2000). Instead, juries would 
make a finding of guilt, and then a judge would ordinarily impose a sentence fixed 
by statute. /d. Judicial discretion in sentencing, when allowed, was restricted to "im-
posing [a] sentence within statutory limits." /d. at 481 (emphasis in original). 
10. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 1124-25 n.204. 
11. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 56. 
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judges a free hand in commenting on evidence and expressing 
their views about a defendant's guilt.12 We would run criminal 
cases in an hour or less. Few, if any, defense lawyers would sup-
port these results. 
Although the Apprendi line of cases advocates rules to constrain 
judges, a return to the eighteenth century would mean getting rid 
of jury instructions, in which judges define mens rea for the jury. 
Absent judicial instruction on mens rea, juries would just decide 
whether a defendant was bad or wicked,13 which is probably not a 
very pro-defendant approach. I might be comfortable with it, but 
many of the newfound friends of originalism would not. 
Would we abolish or loosen the rules of evidence? Would we 
let in past criminal records? During the colonial era, jurors 
could tell if a defendant had a prior felony conviction. A felon 
was branded on the thumb, so a jury readily knew whether the 
defendant was a bad person who did not deserve leniency.14 
Today, the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude most previous 
convictions and other bad acts from evidence.15 Yet pro-
defendant advocates want to have the icing of the originalism 
cake-that is, those parts that are good for defendants-while 
avoiding the other, less tasty parts that cut against their clients. 
Likewise, simplifying jury instructions gives judges a much 
freer hand to voice their own views. Professor Fisher writes 
that one of the themes here is curbing the power of judges.16 
During the eighteenth century, however, judges had great lati-
tude to comment on the evidence, to make their views known, 
and even to lean on juries, short of throwing them in prison.17 
Judges could suggest strongly to juries that there was only one 
12. See infra notes 17-18. 
13. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the /~ole of 
Motive in the Criminal Lnw Pnst nnd Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635,663 (1993). 
14. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 64 (2002); 
see nlso HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT: A RECORD OF MAN'S 
INHUMANITY TO MAN 62 (1930); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND P UNISHMENT 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1993). 
15. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 609. 
16. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 55, 57. 
17. See, e.g., jEROM E FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 112 (1949); FRIEDMAN, suprn note 14, at 245-46; BARBARA J. SHAPfRO, "BE-
YOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW OF EVTDENCE 268-69 n.94 (1991). 
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way to read the evidence.18 Judges were not as timid then as 
they are today; the risk of reversal on appeal or habeas was 
mostly absent. 19 Furthermore, sentences were carried out imme-
diately. In practice, judges had more authority in many ways. 
Professor Fisher replies that we can secure the pro-
defendant benefits of jury findings of certain facts without 
opening up the legal definition of mens rea, the admissibility 
of criminal records, and the like. One cannot, however, so eas-
ily separate these benefits from admitting evidence that is 
currently excluded. Professor Fisher theorizes that the jury is 
not there just to find facts, but more importantly to express 
the conscience of the community and to render full moral 
judgment about what a particular defendant deserves.2o Such 
a full moral judgment requires the jury to see both sides of the 
picture at sentencing. It requires the prior criminal record. 
Giving the jury the power to make moral judgments is incon-
sistent with putting a thumb on the scale and keeping the jury 
from hearing evidence necessary for the full, balanced picture. 
Finally, if we are going to be consistently originalist, we 
would need to make many more reforms as well. We would 
have to follow Justice Thomas's approach to its logical conclu-
sion and abolish the exclusionary rules, thus sacrificing formal-
ism for originalism.21 We would also abolish plea-bargaining.22 
We would then have twenty-five times more trials23-an enor-
mous practical problem. No one except Justice Thomas, and 
probably not even he, is willing to go that far. 
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 17 (2000) (noting an instance in 1741 where a judge instructed 
the jury that " the evidence from the prosecution's witnesses seemed 'so ample, so 
full, so dear and satisfactory' that [the jury) should convict the prisoner ' if [the ju-
rors] have no particular reasons ... to discredit them"'). 
19. See Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 
HARv. L. REV. 657, 658 (1948) (describing the limited role of federal habeas corpus in 
the eighteenth century). 
20. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 55. 
21. See Amar, supra note 6, at 786; Tinsley eta!., supra note 6, at 65. 
22. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 196-97 (arguing that plea bargaining subverts an 
unwaivable constitutional mandate of a jury trial in all criminal cases). 
23. See id. at 197 ("U]ury trials resolve fewer than four percent of criminal cases." 
(citing BUREAU OF }USTlCE STATISTICS, U.S. DEr'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMJ-
NAL JUSTICESTATISTICS 2003, at tbls.5.17, 5.46)). 
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On the Court, we currently have an odd situation where 
originalist criminal procedure cases flow from coalitions compris-
ing the two committed originalists and several other, £air-weather 
originalist Justices. These latter Justices, however, are really moti-
vated by an individual fairness interpretation that is more at 
home in the Due Process Clause.24 The coalition fractures when 
the due process Justices will not consistently go as far as the die-
hard originalists.25 Bizarre cases result in which the Court will not 
follow a principle consistently. The Court will only go so far, but 
not far enough to prevent circumvention by plea-bargain. 
For example, the Supreme Court found a way to uphold the 
federal sentencing gu idelines in United States v. Booker26 because 
Justice Breyer is committed to them - he was their archHect27-
and because he managed to convince Justice Ginsburg that the 
Guidelines are fair enough.28 A few months earlier, however, 
the Court struck down state sentencing guidelines29 that were 
widely recognized as being fair to defendants, less constricting, 
and giving less power to judges to augment sentences with 
relevant conduct.30 When there is no consistent coali tion of five 
originalists on the Supreme Court, we get a hash from the 
Court. Sometimes the Court gets involved selectively, but the 
24. U.S. CONSf. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .... "); see also U.S. CONSf. amend. XIV, § 1 
("!N ]or shaU any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... "). 
25. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (upholding appellate review of 
the substantive reasonableness of sentences against a Sixth Amendment challenge); 
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (same). Justice Scalia wrote a concur-
ring opinion in Gall casting doubt on the compatibility of substantive reasonableness 
review and the Sixth Amendment. Gall, 552 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
26. 543 U.S. 220, 264-65 (2005) (Breyer, j., remedial majority opinion). 
27. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court ltns Mangled American 
Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 392 (2010); 
Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How fo Make fire Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENY. U. L. 
REV. 63, 66-67 (2007). 
28. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (Breyer, j., remedial majority opinion) (noting that 
after the excision of its unconstitutional provisions, the Sentencing Guidelines still 
retained components through which it could accomplish its numerous objectives, 
including sentencing fairness). 
29. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305, 313-14 (2004). 
30. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentenci11g Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unre-
solved Polietj Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1192 (2005). 
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nonoriginalist Justices will not agree to a coherent package of 
rules that would prevent circumvention. 
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Regarding the domain of the Confrontation Clause,31 I par-
tially agree with Professor Fisher. We should follow historical 
precedents when the clear, central cases they were designed to 
deal with are at issue. Cases equivalent to the Sir Walter Ra-
leigh triaV2 where the government tries to railroad a defen-
dant-especially a political defendant-and to circumvent proof 
in open court, are prime examples of cases against which the 
Confrontation Clause was historically designed to protect.33 
The prosecution should not be able to hide behind depositions 
or ex parte interviews by state officials. 
This historical evidence, however, takes us only so far. How 
about 911 calls?34 These calls did not exist in the Framing era. We 
can extrapolate some general ideas about 911 calls, but we have 
to make it up with, at best, some general guidance or princi-
ples.35 No obvious bright-line rule emerges here.36 How about 
the gentle questioning of a rape victim by a battered-women's 
advocate? Is that the same kind of "testimonial" evidence that 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... "). 
32. See THETRIALOF SIR WALTER RALEIGH, KNT. AT WINCHESTER, FOR HIGH TREA-
SON (1603), reprinted in 2 COBBETI'S COMPLETE COLLECflON OF STATE TRIALS 1, 1-60 
(T.B. Howell ed., 1809). 
33. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004) ("[T]he principal evil at 
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused. It was these practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases 
like Raleigh's .... "). 
34. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-29 (2006), the Court held that a 911 
call was nontestimonial because its principal purpose was to secure aid, and so ad-
mitting the call's contents into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
35. See id. at 822 (relying on whether a police officer's primary purpose during an 
interrogation was to respond to an emergency or to generate information that may 
be used in a criminal prosecution as the dispositive factor in deciding whether the 
statements generated by the interrogation were testimonial). 
36. Cf David A. Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 40 ("In many 
ways, the Line between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay remains indistinct 
but the Court has made reasonably clear that certain kinds of hearsay-casual re-
marks among friends, for example-are nontestimonial and therefore raise no con-
stitutional problems .... "). 
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the Framers dreaded? Not really. Ultimately, we might be able 
to extend some of the historical principles a little bit, but we 
have to be very cautious because today's issues do not involve 
the same set of considerations that concerned the Framers. 
Also worth noting is that the rules of evidence and the way 
the courts approached confrontation were in flux in the eight-
eenth century.37 Professor Fisher's approach, which he per-
suaded the Court to adopt in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,38 
thus freezes in place a snapshot of law that was changing in the 
late eighteenth century. 
In some types of cases, Professor Fisher has a point. For exam-
ple, we have had some scandals in America in which lab examin-
ers have faked forensic tests.39 Even though it is possible to rerun 
many of these tests, bright-line application of the Confrontation 
Clause provides another solution. The functionalist argument in 
this case confirms for us that the formalist or originalist reading is 
not ridiculous or disastrous. So formalism, functionalism, and 
originalism work together here. 
Consider, however, a different example: coroners' autopsies 
and inquests. In a drug case, lab examiners usually perform tests 
and then testify within a year after the drug test was completed. 
Because murder does not have a statute of limitations, however, 
it may be ten or twenty years until an accused murderer is 
tried - long after the victim's autopsy was performed. By the 
time of trial, the coroner may be dead or otherwise unavailable. 
Even if the coroner is available, what is he going to do? Does the 
coroner have an independent memory of one specific autopsy 
out of the thousand he has done over the last ten or twenty years? 
No. At trial, he would just read his years-old autopsy report un-
der the evidentiary fiction of present recollection refreshed.40 
I 
37. See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modem Evide11ce Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 502-04, 
533-39 (1999); Sklansky, suprn note 36, at 41-42. 
38. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (holding that the Confrontation Clause bars admit-
ting into evidence a lab examiner's report unless the prosecution makes the decla-
rant available for cross-examination). 
39. See, e.g., A Year of Scandals with Forensic Evidence, WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at 
AS; Eric Lichtblau, Scie111ist Falsified DNA Reports, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at A21; 
Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to 
Scrutiny Seen Across U. S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at Cl. 
40. See FED. R. Evro. 612. 
52 Harvard journal of Law & Public Polietj [Vol. 34 
When questioned about the autopsy, he would say, "yes, in fact, I 
found this bullet three centimeters above the spleen."41 
No solid historical evidence says that we must reach this re-
sult based on eighteenth-century precedent, and there are sub-
s tantial policy and common sense reasons to believe that we 
should not. There are good reasons to think that the Framers 
would not have extended confrontation this fa r; they articu-
lated a slogan about confrontation without fleshing out its 
outer limits.u So we should be very careful, particularly about 
turning confrontation into a bright-line rule where its bounda-
ries traditionally have not been so clear. 
Finally, originalism provides only a minimum, not a maximum. 
The rules of criminal procedure take care of updating many other 
safeguards to fit the modem landscape. If we want to look seri-
ously at what it takes to confront complicated scientific and foren-
sic evidence, the word in the Sixth Amendment is not cross-
examine, it is "confront,"43 which may be broader. What does it 
take to produce an effective cross-examination? Is support for fo-
rensic experts required? An originalist focus might distract from 
serving those originalist values in more modem ways.44 
My bottom line is two cheers, not three, for originalism in 
criminal procedure. Originalism works pretty well in core cases 
like the Sir Walter Raleigh trial, but much of what we are liti-
gating today is beyond those core cases, as Professor Fisher ef-
fectively concedes.45 There are real dangers in taking what was 
an evolving rule and freezing it into a bright-line slogan that 
can be both over- and under-inclusive. 
41 . Besides being largely unhelph1l, cross-examination of medical experts may be 
unnecessary to avoid the miscarriages of justice against which the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to protect. See Sklansky, supra note 36, at 45-46. 
42. See id. at 35-37. 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
44. See Sklansky, supra note 36, at 50-57. 
45. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 56, 59. 
